Obama and Iranian Cooperation in Afghanistan

Engaging Iran on Afghan War as First Step to Nuclear Negotiations

Feb 9, 2009 Vincent Gagnon-Lefebvre

Several strategies are offered to win the Afghan war, whether by sending more troops or withdrawing them. Either way, Iran's cooperation could to be the key to success.

In a recent paper published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a US-based nonpartisan think-tank, French expert on Afghanistan Gilles Dorronsoro offers five recommendations for what he calls a “focus and exit strategy” to the Afghan War as an alternative to the Iraq-like “troop surge” widely advocated in the last months (See Focus and Exit: An Alternative Strategy for the Afghan War):

1. Available resources must shape the strategy, not the other way around;
2. The main objective is to leave an Afghan government that can survive a US and NATO withdrawal;
3. The only way to weaken, and perhaps divide, the armed opposition is to reduce military confrontations;
4. The only meaningful way to halt the insurgency’s momentum is to start withdrawing troops;
5. Withdrawal would allow the United States to focus on the central security problems in the region: al-Qaeda and the instability in Pakistan.

With the new US administration of President Barack Obama willing to engage into a new dialog with Iran, building a cooperative Washington-Tehran relationship on Afghanistan could prove a win-win opportunity for both countries' interests. It would also serve as a first step to built a higher level of trust before tackling more sensitive issues like Iran's nuclear program or the latter's relations with Hamas and Hezbollah.

Step One: Iran's Converging Interests with the US in Afghanistan

If Dorronsoro's recommendations are given a serious thought in the White House, Iran could be expected to give them its full support. Not only does this “focus and exit” strategy answer many concerns that Iran has over the deteriorating situation in this war that it initially supported in 2001, but Tehran's cooperation would also prove very helpful in implementing it. Looking over each of the five recommendations, here is how Iran would fit into the strategy:

1. Iranian territory could prove a very convenient supply line for NATO troops as an alternative to the unreliable Pakistani route or the long and costly Russia-Central Asian one;
2. Iran has been a strong supporter of the Afghan government and the main reason why Tehran is opposed to the formation of Pashtun counter-insurgency militias is that it would weaken Kabul. Iranian diplomatic and economic support is indispensable to the central Afghan government's survival after US and NATO withdrawal;
3. While Iran is very concerned by the Taliban's resurgence, Tehran has for a long time been blaming this resurgence on the presence of foreign troops;
4. While withdrawing troops is risky, Iran could make this process less painful by using its deep influence to assure stability in northern and central Afghanistan;
5. Pakistan's destabilization caused by the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan as resulted in a distrustful relationship between Tehran and Islamabad – both suspecting the other of playing a double game. Withdrawal would help lessen tensions and improve the regional environment. The same could be said of Iran-India and India-Pakistan relations.

Step Two: Nuclear Cooperation Instead of Confrontation

So if Obama is to shed his predecessor's ideological lenses regarding Iran and acknowledge new geopolitical realities in the region, he could built on the momentum of US-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan to pass to the second step in this new dialog. This other issue that could bring common understanding between the two countries is – perhaps surprisingly – nuclear proliferation and particularly the threat of non-state nuclear terrorism.

The fact is that Iran, because of its porous borders, is far more at risk of falling victim to nuclear terrorism than the United States or even Israel. The proliferation of vehemently anti-Shiite extremist groups in the Persian Gulf region, Afghanistan and Pakistan is a real concern for Tehran. If Obama understands that there is no Muslim country other than Iran more eager and predisposed to fight al-Qaeda – against which nuclear deterrence is useless – confrontation over nuclear negotiation could transform into cooperation.

With a rational instead of ideological read of the conclusions of the 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which stated that Iran put an end to its weapons program in 2003, Obama could find a serious partner who is just as concerned as Washington by Pakistan's possible breakdown or by nuclear theft from insufficiently secure facilities around the world.

Whether the West like it or not, Iran's complete mastery of nuclear energy, under its rights as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, will soon be reality. No carrot nor stick will change that fact. But a vision of US-Iran relations based on mutual interests and factual intelligence – and not on ideologically colored rhetoric – could prove far more successful in addressing issues of stability and security. This is only if Obama is really serious about grasping opportunities of meaningful change with the new regional power that is Iran.

The copyright of the article Obama and Iranian Cooperation in Afghanistan in Middle Eastern Affairs is owned by Vincent Gagnon-Lefebvre. Permission to republish Obama and Iranian Cooperation in Afghanistan in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.

The debate is now over more troops or to withdraw

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